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FOREWORD
THE SUCCESS OF THE EURO
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NEW
REGULATORY INITIATIVES
The European Union (or "EU") offers unique opportunities
and challenges to our global economy. Its affects on interna-
tional banking and commerce will be profound. From an eco-
nomic perspective, there are serious questions as to the effects of
a united Europe on the world monetary exchange. The intro-
duction of the euro will change markets for capital, including
long-term debt issued by sovereign governments, corporations,
and other large entities. As the popularity of the euro grows,
central banks will face questions as to the significance of the dol-
lar as a reserve currency. The effects of administrating and ac-
counting for the new currency may also be profound.
Superimposed on these profound changes are new regula-
tion, reporting, and disclosure requirements for EU Member
States. The effect of the euro on international regulation will be
monumental. The first challenges to the euro may not come
from trading difficulties or administrative reorganizations, but
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from disputes over new regulatory frameworks in which to oper-
ate the new Europe.
While each Member State continues to issue its own debt,
there is likely to be a movement toward standardization and
transparency of the government markets to comply with the re-
quirements of a liquid, institutional securities market. Debt
likely will be issued on a pre-announced schedule, with standard-
ization as to maturities and coupon payments. There will even
be pressure on countries to eliminate nonstandard practices,
such as withholding taxes, in order to be considered part of the
"benchmark" pool.
Recently, the Finnish government, which takes over the EU
presidency in June, opposed the extension of qualified majority
voting to income and corporation taxes.' According to the Finn-
ish prime minister, income and corporate tax issues must remain
sovereign powers and are not a matter of EU majority consent.2
The signs of legal and regulatory uncertainty begin to appear.
These signs will continue to arise over the coming months and
years.
Right now is, therefore, a decisive time for regulation in Eu-
rope and in the United States. The future of the international
capital markets hangs in the balance. In the United States, regu-
lators are looking at regulating the multi-trillion dollar over-the-
counter derivatives3 market place, which is, for the most part,
unregulated. Brooksley Born, the Chairperson of the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), has issued a concept
release intimating her desire to expand the CFTC's regulatory
authority into the over-the-counter derivatives arena.4 Chairman
Greenspan of the Federal Reserve, Secretary Rubin of the U.S.
Treasury, and Chairman Levitt of the Securities Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") have announced their opposition to any new
1. Andrew Parker, Finns Oppose Majority Voting over EU Taxes, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1999, at 3.
2. Id.
3. Derivatives are contracts whose value fluctuates based on the change in price of
an underlying index, bond, interest rate, index, currency, or other investment.
4. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Over the Counter Derivatives, 63
Fed. Reg. 26114 (1998). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") con-
cept release can be obtained at the CFTC web cite, <http://www.cftc.gov>, or by contact-
ing the office of the Secretariat, Three Lafayette Center, 1155 21st St., N.W. Washing-
ton D.C. 20581, (202) 418-5100.
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regulation by the CFTC.5 One of the crucial elements of this
controversy is the fear that increased regulation will steer deriva-
tive business offshore and into safer harbors.
In the wake of the recent long-term capital debacle and
bailout,6 and possibly in response to the CFTC's overtures, some
of the world's largest financial institutions recently reached an
agreement to try to set their own industry wide standards for the
huge and volatile derivatives market place.7 Chairman Levitt
participated in the discussions. Alan Greenspan and Robert
Rubin have indicated that they are friendly to the idea of indus-
try guidelines as an alternative to increased governmental regu-
lation.' The loosening noose of regulation in favor of self-polic-
ing by the industry may make domestic, capital markets more at-
tractive to the world financial players.
The repercussions of a new European economy subjected to
the organization and regulation of a new European Central
Bank will change the playing field for international monetary
transactions. The shift in regulatory authority from individual
states to a centralized leadership is a wild card that may present a
level of uncertainty for business leaders and regulators alike.
Ms.,Jones' Essay focuses on the trading implications and
possible financial ramifications of a new euro currency. It be-
hooves the reader, however, to consider these changes in the
context of regulatory advances and distractions in the United
States and throughout the world. Perhaps the deciding factor
for the success or failure of the euro as a new and alternative
reserve currency lies in the regulatory focus of those who might
control its utilization. The economic ramification of regulatory
dissonance in the new Europe may secure the U.S. dollar's place
as the currency force driving international economics.
5. Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O'Brien, Financiers Plan to Put Controls on Deriva-
tives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at C-1.
6. David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, Who's in Charge? Agency Infighting and Regulatory Un-
certainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at C14.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
On January 1, 1999, Europe's new currency-the euro-
made its debut on the global financial scene. On this date, the
euro became the common currency for eleven European na-
tions, with more countries scheduled to join in the next few
years. European Monetary Union ("EMU") has been a dream
of European leaders, and the euro represents the culmination of
many years of preparation.
Europe has a long history of trying to achieve currency sta-
bility. As far back as the Latin Monetary Union9 in the nine-
teenth century, there had been efforts to create a single regional
currency, but none succeeded. After the Bretton Woods Agree-
ment1" ended in the 1970s, Europe devised currency bands
(commonly called "the snake") to try to keep the various curren-
cies in narrow bands with limited fluctuations. That attempt
ended badly with Britain being forced out almost as soon as it
joined. Subsequently, Denmark, Italy, and France left for at least
some period of time. Four years after its inception, the snake
was really a collection of Deutsche mark-related currencies. Ger-
many, the Benelux countries, and the Scandinavian countries
were represented, but no other European nations were. In 1979,
the European Monetary System ("EMS") was devised to bring
France back into currency partnership with the rest of Europe.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism ("ERM"), an updated version of
"the snake," was created as was the European Currency Unit
("ECU"), a common currency. Britain finally joined the ERM in
1990, only to be forced out in 1992. Despite these setbacks, Eu-
rope's politicians have forged ahead with the latest plan-EMU
and the euro. In the context of history, the euro is just another
step in the evolutionary process of trying to unite Europe.
Preparation for the euro began several years ago when
policymakers decided that a common European currency would
be the best way to pull together the continent as a global polit-
ical and economic power. The Treaty on European Union11
9. The Latin Monetary Union was created in 1865 by France, Switzerland,
Belgium, Italy, and Greece. See Lawrence Ingrassin, Exchequered Past, WALL ST. J., Jan.
13, 1996, at 1 (noting that all prior monetary unions without political structure failed).
10. Bretton Woods Agreement, Act of July 31, 1945, ch. 339, § 14, 59 Stat. 512
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
11. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
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("Maastricht Treaty"), negotiated in 1992, is the EMU's
"blueprint." It lays out the rules and regulations of monetary
union, stipulating the entry requirements for member countries
and the standards of fiscal policy that must be upheld for mem-
bership. On the weekend of May 1, 1998, eleven member coun-
tries of the European Union met the economic criteria required
by the Maastricht Treaty to join together in a common currency.
The United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark also met the crite-
ria but decided not to join in a currency union at that time.
Greece, the only remaining member of the European Union,
did not meet the economic criteria. Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain agreed to begin taking the steps necessary to
integrate their national currency units ("NCUs") into a single
currency unit tided the euro.
This Essay outlines the specific events leading to the com-
mon currency as well as the implications for trading foreign ex-
change, short-term interest rate futures, and fixed-income secur-
ities and futures. It describes the mechanics of the newly formed
European Central Bank ("ECB") and outlines the potential ef-
fects on monetary policy and economics in individual countries.
I. EURO TRANSACTIONS AND TIMETABLE
Non-cash payments in euro began January 1, 1999, and in-
volved setting the rate for all wholesale transactions undertaken
in the eleven countries converting to the euro. Wholesale trans-
actions include foreign exchange trading, securities issuance,
government debt issuance, payments between suppliers and cor-
porations, and corporate deposits and loans, for example.
Credit card or check payments, even at the retail level, might
also be included. Euro will not be used, however, in cash pay-
ments or payments made with notes and coins right away. Euro
notes and coins will not be issued until January 1, 2002, and
NCU notes and coins will not be completely withdrawn until July
1, 2002.
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741. The Treaty on European Union amended,
inter alia, the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty"),
renaming it the Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 0.j. C 224/
1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by
TEU, supra.
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Even at the retail level, conversion to the euro is apparent
afterJanuary 1, 1999. Shop owners post prices in both NCU and
euro. Banks offer individuals the ability to carry deposits, write
checks, or make credit card charges in euro. The goal is to take
every step to make the transition to the common currency as
smooth and easy as possible.
It is important to note that the Maastricht Ttreaty has
adopted a no prohibition/no compulsion rule between January 1,
1999 and December 31, 2001. This policy entails that no party
can be forced or prohibited from using the euro. What this pol-
icy implies is that transactions on the books before January 1,
1999 will not automatically convert to the euro; rather, conver-
sion will take place by mutual agreement between parties. This
policy will likely result in some uncertainty and discrepancies
during the transition period as systems are updated and parties
negotiate individual conversions. A summary of the timetable
for euro conversion is shown in Table 1.
II. CONVERSION
The irrevocable conversion rates for each participating
NCU into the euro were established on Thursday, December 31,
1998. On May 1, 1998, the eleven member countries adopted
the bilateral exchange rates on which the irrevocable exchange
rates were set. Because the Maastricht Treaty calls for 1:1 con-
version between the ECU and the euro, however, and because
the ECU includes three non-euro currencies, 12 the exact conver-
sion rates were not determined until December 31, 1998. In
other words, the eleven euro countries could have established
conversion rates before this date if it were not for the obligation
to convert through the ECU, which includes these three non-
1articipating currencies. Table 2 shows which currencies are in-
cluded in ECU and which ones are included the euro. On De-
cember 31, the ECU ceased to exist, and the conversion rates for
the first eleven member countries became permanent.
On December 31, 1998, the member countries followed a
three-step process to determine the fixed conversion rate to the
euro. The first step was to convert each NCU into its exchange
rate against the U.S. dollar, using the 11:30 A.M. (CET) official
12. The Greek drachma, Danish krone, and British pound are the three non-euro
currencies included in the ECU.
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ECU fixing and the pre-announced ERIVI bilateral central rates.
The second step was to calculate the exchange rate of the official
ECU, using the rates recorded in the first. step. The U.S. dollar/
ECU rate is obtained by summing the weighted dollar
equivalents of national currency that compose the ECU. The
third step was to calculate the official NCU exchange rate
against the euro by multiplying the U.S. dollar/ECU exchange
rate by each NCU's U.S. dollar exchange rate.
The eleven countries initially participating in the euro
agreed to maintain their bilateral exchange rates leading up to
the conversion weekend. Fluctuations in the currencies of the
three non-participating countries that make up part of -the ECU
could have caused euro conversion rates to fluctuate a great deal
before the conversion weekend; this, however, did not occur.
As a matter of convention, the European Monetary Institute
has recommended that the euro become the' base currency
quoted in currency relationships, so one euro would equal a set
amount of another currency. This use of the euro results, how-
ever, in changes to current practices for trading in the British
pound and the U.S. dollar, so market convention could not be
known until trading actually begins. In addition, under the rules
for conversion, the euro is expressed in terms of each of the par-
ticipating national currencies to six significant digits. Note that
this rule applies only to "in" currencies; no conventions have yet
been established for converting the euro to "out" currencies. Fi-
nally, the sub-unit of the euro is the cent, and the plurals of the
euro and the cent will be expressed without an "s."
III. ECB AND MONETARY POLICY
The economic and monetary union called for in the Maas-
tricht Treaty13 established the European System of Central Banks
("ESCB") to maintain price stability.14 The ESCB consists of the
European Central Bank and the fifteen national central banks
("NCBs").' 5 Starting January 1, 1999, a single monetary policy
for all eleven members of the EMU was implemented by the ECB
instead of each country's individual central banks. The NCBs
13. EC Treaty, supra note 11, tit. VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 33-43 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 636-55.
14. Id. art. 4a, O.J. C 224/1, at 9 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590.
15. Id. art. 106, O.J. C 224/1, at 37 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 642.
1999]
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will continue to exist for purposes of executing ECB policies and
coordinating with national governments for debt issuance and
fiscal policy. The four outlying NCBs continue to maintain in-
dependent monetary policy, but it will be in their interest to co-
ordinate with the ECB.
The ECB is divided into two main decision-making bodies,
the Executive Board and the Governing Council.1 6 The Execu-
tive Board will consist of a president, vice president, and four
other members who are nominated by a majority of the political
leadership of the eleven countries, affirmed by the European
Parliament, and later confirmed in writing by political leaders in
each country.1 7 Board members will serve an eight-year term.
The Governing Council will consist of the six Executive Board
members and one governor from each of the eleven participat-
ing national central banks.
The Governing Council is responsible for various functions:
formulating euro monetary policy, e.g., monetary objectives and
interest rate targets, adopting organizational rules and proce-
dures for the ECB, deciding ECB financial matters, including
holding or transferring central bank reserves to or from the
ECB, allocating profits and losses, and conducting money mar-
ket operations, and adopting regulations, decisions, and recom-
mendations. Most Governing Council decisions are made on a
one-person, one-vote basis, with decisions taken by a simple ma-
jority. There are some exceptions in which only NCB governors
vote on a weighted basis, with decisions taken by a qualified ma-
jority. For example, decisions on various financial matters such
as transfer of an NCBs foreign reserve assets to the ECB, or allo-
cation of ECB trading profits and losses, are made by qualified
majority.
The Executive Board will be responsible for the day-to-day
functioning of the ECB. These responsibilities include imple-
menting the monetary policy established by the Governing
Council, instructing NCBs, and preparing for Governing Coun-
cil meetings. Each Executive Board member has one vote and
decisions taken by a simple majority.
The Maastricht Treaty defined the ECB's primary goal as
16. Id. art. 109a, OJ. C 224/1, at 38 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 645.
17. Id.
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price stability."8 This goal was later narrowed to monetary target-
ing and direct inflation targeting. A preliminary framework for
ECB operation already has been adopted and consists of three
monetary policy instruments-open market operations, standing
facilities, and a minimum reserve requirement.
The open market operations will consist of (1) liquidity pro-
viding reverse transactions with a weekly frequency and a matur-
ity of two weeks, (2) longer-term refinancing operations with a
monthly frequency and a maturity of three months, (3) fine-tun-
ing operations, and (4) structural operations such as securities
purchases. The standing facilities will include a marginal lend-
ing facility to obtain overnight liquidity from the NCBs against
eligible assets and a deposit facility to make overnight deposits
with the NCBs. These facilities are designed to provide a ceiling
and floor on the overnight funds rate and can be compared to
the U.S. federal funds markets. Finally, the ECB will set a reserve
requirement for all banks in the eleven euro countries of 1.5%-
2.5% of bank funds, including deposits, debt securities issued,
and money-market paper. The reserves will be deposited in in-
terest-bearing accounts with the NCBs.
Decisions taken by the ECB are legally binding in all Mem-
ber States and on all persons in those Member States. In effect,
individual national governments will no longer be able to make
unilateral decisions on monetary policy. As a result, national
governments in Member States will be limited to fiscal policy de-
cisions to counteract any variations in their national economic
situation due to euro monetary policies. Even fiscal policy could
be somewhat restricted due to Treaty guidelines on the size of
national deficits and debt levels. This dilution of national con-
trol over economic policy has sparked a great deal of debate over
the smoothness of the transition to the euro.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE
A. Legacy Positions
Due to the no prohibition/no compulsion rule, positions in leg-
acy currencies (NCU of the eleven participating Member States)
that mature after the conversion weekend will not be automati-
cally converted to euro. Parties, however, can mutually agree to
18. Id. art. 105, O.J. C 244/1, at 36 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at 641.
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convert such positions to euro, and many such agreements al-
ready have taken place. Any agreement to convert legacy posi-
tions to euro, whether they are for swaps, forwards, or options,
must be confirmed by both parties in writing. The one excep-
tion to noncompulsory automatic conversion is the ECU, which
was converted 1:1 into the euro according to the Maastricht
Treaty.
Currency futures, such as the Deutsche mark, French franc,
and ECU contracts listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
("CME"), will be subject to specific exchange announcements
for each contract. As of late November, the CME had plans to
convert only the outstanding ECU contracts automatically to
euro. The current ECU futures contract will then be renamed
"Euro FX." The CME will continue to list Deutsche marks,
French francs, and possibly other Deutsche mark cross-rate
products until July 1, 2002. The CME now lists Euro FX cross
contracts (i.e., Euro FX/Japanese yen cross and Euro FX/Swiss
franc cross) as of January 11, 1998.
B. New Cross Rates
There continues to be considerable disagreement over
whether speculative trade will continue in NCUs versus other
currencies after the conversion weekend. Most active dealers
and exchanges have stated that they will continue to maintain
active markets in the legacy NCUs until they lose legal tender
status on July 1, 2002. It is the stated intent of the participating
countries, however, to maintain the conversion exchange rates
at all costs. The Member States adopted a Stability and Growth
Pact19 that provides for sanctions against countries that run ex-
19. The Stability and Growth pact is composed of one political recommendation
and two regulations. Council Recommendation of 7July 1997 on the broad guidelines
of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community, O.J. L 209/12
(1997); Council Regulation No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies, O.J. L 209/1 (1997); Council Regulation No. 1467/97 of 7July 1997 on speed-
ing up and carifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, O.J. L 209/
6 (1997); see RogerJ. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever
Fy?, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 249, 310-13 (1998); see also Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, The
Introduction of the Euro: Overuiew of the Legal Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM.
J. EUR. L 321, 330-31 (1998) (discussing two components of Stability and Growth Pact).
The European Council issued a resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact that set
forth firm commitments of the Member States, the Commission, and the Council re-
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cessive deficits after the euro launch.
The firmness of commitment to the plan by these countries
remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that volatility between
NCUs has all but disappeared. As illustrated in Figure 1, the
Deutsche mark/Italian lira exchange rate converged going into
the first weekend in May and has since remained stable.
FIGURE 1
Exchange Rate: Deutsche mark per Italian lire
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Source: Reuters
One complication in calculating the new cross rates be-
tween the "in" currencies results from the requirement that they
be calculated through the euro and rounded to the nearest sixth
digit. The procedures for conversion have been laid out in Eu-
ropean Council Article 235. The conversion rate shall be ex-
pressed as one euro in terms of each NCU taken to six signifi-
cant digits (e.g., 1 euro = DM 1.96953). The conversion rates
shall not be rounded or truncated when making conversion cal-
culations. Actual amounts to be paid or accounted for after a
conversion must be rounded up or down to the nearest sub-unit,
with amounts exactly in the midpoint rounded up. Conversion
between two NCUs within the euro must be done via the euro.
This process is known as triangulation and can be illustrated as
follows.
garding the implementation of the pact. See Resolution of the European Council on
the Stability and Growth Pact of 17 June 1997, Amsterdam, O.J. C 236/1 (1997).
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First, to convert one national currency (e.g., the Italian lira)
into another national currency (e.g., the Deutsche mark), it is
necessary to first convert the Italian lira into euro (e.g., L
25,000,000 * 1,949.84 L/euro = euro 12,821.56484635 as an un-
rounded calculated intermediate euro amount). Second, it is
permissible to round the intermediate euro amount to no fewer
than three decimals (e.g., the above amount could be rounded
to euro 12,821.565 or euro 12,821.5648, but not euro 12,821.56).
It is not necessary to record this intermediate amount. Because
different parties may use different rounding amounts, however,
recording the intermediate step may help resolve discrepancies
in conversion amounts. Third, the intermediate euro amount is
then converted into Deutsche marks, rounded to the nearest
currency unit (e.g., euro 12,821.565 x 1.96953 DM/euro = DM
25,252.4470668 as an unrounded calculated amount, rounded to
DM 25,252.45. Note that if the unrounded intermediate amount
of euro 12,821.56484635 were used in the calculation, then the
result would be an unrounded DM 25,252.45661183, rounded to
DM 25,252.46).
These rules of conversion apply in all fifteen EU Member
States, including the "opt-out" countries. The rounding rules
apply solely in the context of conversion between the euro and
participating NCUs or between participating NCUs. They do
not apply in other contexts, such as calculation of interest pay-
ments on loan amounts. Conversion between the euro or the
NCUs and non-euro currency units, for example the British
pound, Japanese yen, and Swiss franc, will take place in the same
way that foreign exchange transactions are currently carried out.
Article 235 does not apply.
C. Trading the Euro Versus Other Currencies
The pre-conversion ECU may not be a good proxy for the
euro's future performance. This discrepancy can be seen by ex-
amining the relationship between the Deutsche mark and the
ECU over the last few years (Figure 2). Even after the May 1,
1998 weekend, there was quite a bit of volatility in the relation-
ship between the Deutsche mark and the ECU. This volatility
was largely due to the influence of the British pound, which rep-
resents about thirteen percent of the ECU's value.
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FIGURE 2
Exchange Rate: Deutsche mark per European Currency Unit
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As Figure 3 shows, a glance at the British pound/Deutsche
mark cross rate during this period makes this influence even
more evident.
3.1
2.9
, 2.7
2.5
2.3
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1/94
Source: Reuters
FIGURE 3
Deutsche mark per British pound
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
By definition, a common currency leads to a common mon-
etary policy and a single money market rate. As individual NCBs
Exchange Rate:
1999]
800 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:786
lose their ability to control the money supply, the short-term in-
terest rate will converge in all eleven participating countries. As
can be seen in Figure 4, three-month money market rates al-
ready have converged substantially. After the conversion week-
end, there is now a single rate, which is slightly higher than the
rates prevailing for the euromark and the Paris International
Bank Offered Rate 21 ("PIBOR") but lower than those for the
eurolira and Madrid International Bank Offered Rate
("MIBOR") .21 This equivalence can also be seen in the prices
currently quoted for the March 1999 euromark, PIBOR, and
eurolira futures contracts.22
FIGURE 4
Convergence of Money Market Rates
7.5- 7.5 Italy
6.5
5.5
4.5 ECU 
v-
3.5
2.5
1/97 3/97 6/97 9/97 12/97 2/98 5/98 8/98 11/98
Source: Wharton Economics Forecasting Associates; Reuters
There is some controversy over whether the benchmark rate
that replaces the ECU London International Bank Offered
Rate23 ("LIBOR") -used as a benchmark in swaps and futures
markets-will be the British Bankers Association ("BBA") euro
20. The Paris International Bank Offered Rate ("PIBOR") is an interest rate fu-
tures contract. It represents short-term interest rates on U.S. dollar-denominated de-
posits outside the United States.
21. The Madrid International Bank Offered Rate ("MIBOR") is an interest rate
futures contract. See supra note 20.
22. For example, on November 20, the March euromark settled at 96.61, the
PIBOR at 96.60, and the eurolira at 96.59.
23. The London International Bank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") is an interest rate
futures contract. See supra note 20.
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LIBOR or the newly-created European International Bank Of-
fered Rate ("EURIBOR") .24 Like other LIBOR rates, BBA LI-
BOR will be based on a daily survey of sixteen major financial
institutions in London. Current plans for EURIBOR call for a
survey of fifty-seven financial institutions in all eleven financial
centers. Both rates will be calculated on an actual/360-day
count and be based'on T+2 settlement.
Many market participants expect EURIBOR to be slightly
higher than euro LIBOR because there are many less
creditworthy banks included in the fifty-seven financial institu-
tions surveyed for the former rate. In addition, deposits made in
euro-country banks will be subject to a reserve requirement. It is
likely that the EURIBOR-setting procedure will be revised if
there is a substantial divergence from the euro LIBOR.
After the conversion weekend, the euromark, PIBOR, euro,
eurolira, and MIBOR futures contracts are all effectively identi-
cal and interchangeable. There is a slight risk that an individual
country might break away from EMU and revert to its former
NCU and money market rate. The market, however, is currently
discounting this risk to nearly nothing. For example, the June
2000 euromark and eurolira futures contracts are priced within
two basis points of each.other. In general, the European futures
exchanges have adopted plans to convert their short-term inter-
est rate futures to euro interest rate futures even before the con-
version weekend. Each exchange has different plans, ranging
from forced conversion at the London International Finance Fu-
tures Exchange ("LIFFE"), the French International Futures Ex-
change ("MATIF"), and the Spanish Finance Futures Exchange
("MEFF") to spread trading at the Eurex. Following is a general
outline of each exchange's plans. Holders of short-term interest
rate futures positions are advised to check with the individual
exchanges for more detailed procedures.
A. LIFFE
LIFFE implemented a mandatory conversion process of its
euromark and eurolira futures contracts into euro LIBOR fu-
tures during the weekend of January 23-24, 1999. On Friday,
January 22, LIFFE ensured that the settlement prices for the
24. Similar to PIBOR, LIBOR, and MIBOR, the European International Bank Of-
fered Rate ("EURIBOR") is an interest rates futures contract. See supra note 20.
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euromark, eurolira, and euro LIBOR futures contracts were
identical across all maturities and across all strike prices for the
options. The eurolira and euromark contracts were be con-
verted into euro at the fixed NCU rates determined on the Janu-
ary 1 conversion weekend. Conversion occurred at the member
firm position level unless a member requested conversion be
done at the client level. Fractional contracts resulting from the
conversion process were rounded to the nearest whole lot, with
resulting odd lots allocated to the largest NCU money market
futures or options position at the member firm account position
level.
B. Eurex
Eurex2 5 has introduced several euro short-term interest rate
futures as well as one-month and three-month contracts for both
EURIBOR and euro LIBOR. Until the conversion weekend, the
contracts were settled in ECU. Traders can use normal spread
trading procedures to convert their euromark positions to euro
interest rate positions. The exchange will enable simultaneous
trading of both euro and euromark futures at least until the
March 1999 expiration. As of the conversion weekend, the
euromark contract is considered a foreign currency future, and
its variation margin will be converted daily from Deutsche marks
to euro at the conversion rate.
C. MA TTE
The MATIF has decided to guarantee conversion of all
PIBOR futures into the new euro interest rate futures. It intro-
duced a three-month EURIBOR contract settled in ECU until
the conversion weekend and in euro afterward. PIBOR con-
tracts continued to trade until the conversion weekend. After
the conversion weekend, these contracts no longer trade, but
they will continue to be cleared until June 1999 with margin re-
quirements converted to euro. PIBOR positions can be rolled at
the conversion rate into the new EURIBOR contracts via either
the exchange's matched book conversion, which matches aggre-
gate member conversion orders, or the voluntary conversion fa-
cility, in which MATIF takes the other side of the conversion
25. The Eurex was formerly the Deutsche Terminbbrse and the Swiss Options and
Financial Futures Exchange.
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trade. The PIBOR contracts still open on June 14, 1999 will be
automatically converted into euro futures, with odd contracts
rounded up to the nearest whole contract.
D. MUF
The MEFF will adopt a "big bang" approach to the introduc-
tion of its EURIBOR contract. On the conversion weekend, all
outstanding MIBOR futures positions were converted automati-
cally to EURIBOR positions at the announced peseta/euro con-
version rate. Because the new EURIBOR contract is larger than
the MIBOR contract, the resulting fractional contract positions
will be cash settled. All outstanding MIBOR orders were auto-
matically canceled, and new EURIBOR orders must be reen-
tered after the conversion weekend.
E. Short-Term Interest Rate Trading Strategies
The new euro LIBOR contracts create several trading pos-
sibilities for short-term interest rate futures. For example, it is
possible to speculate on whether the United Kingdom will join
the EMU or on how the newly-created single monetary policy
will fare versus more-established monetary policies. In addition,
because strips of euro LIBOR contracts are available until 2002,
it is possible to take positions that can profit from any steepen-
ing or flattening of the new euro yield curve. It is perhaps easi-
est to undertake any of these trades on LIFFE, where the euro
LIBOR contract trades alongside short sterling, the euroswiss,
and the euroyen. Here's how some of these trades might look:
1. If a trader believes that the United Kingdom will join the
EMU by 2002, as some pundits are predicting, buying a de-
ferred short sterling futures contract and selling a deferred
euro LIBOR contract would be a possibility. Because British
rates are higher than the prevailing euro rates, British rates
are likely to fall if they converge to euro rates. LIFFE cross-
margins the short sterling and euro LIBOR contracts at a
thirty percent reduction in initial margin. The trade would
be ratioed at four short sterling contracts to three euro LI-
BOR contracts.
2. A trader who thinks that the ECB will be forced to tighten
monetary policy to maintain the strength of the euro, result-
ing in an increase in euro rates versus U.S. dollar rates could
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buy a eurodollar futures contract on the CME and sell a euro
LIBOR contract on LIFFE. The ratio would be about twelve
eurodollar futures for ten euro LIBOR futures; there is no
cross-margining between the two exchanges.
3. Finally, it is possible to take positions that profit from changes
in the euro yield curve. The curve is very flat with three-
month rates predicted by the March 1999 future of about
3.40% and three-month rates predicted by the March 2002
future of about 4.10%. Traders betting on a steepening of
the curve could buy the March 1999 euro LIBOR future and
sell the March 2002 euro LIBOR future. Current spread mar-
gining for this trade at LIFFE is fifty percent of initial margins
for each contract.
VI. FIXED-INCOME TRADING IMPLICATIONS
Introduction of the euro also will change the markets for
long-term debt issued by sovereign governments, corporations,
and other large entities. First, long-term debt denominated in
euros will become much more attractive to a wide variety of insti-
tutional investors. In the past, debt issued in any currency other
than the U.S. dollar-and possibly the Japanese yen -and
Deutsche mark-was not traded in markets big enough or liquid
enough to attract large institutional investors. In addition, many
pension plans, insurance companies, and mutual funds were
subject to restrictions on currency risk. Elimination of currency
risk for investments within fellow euro-zone countries will nullify
these restrictions and vastly increase the number of investments
that are eligible for these portfolios.
Second, the euro's introduction should result in an increase
in the European long-term debt market, making it the largest in
the world. The Bank for International Settlements states that
the nominal value of the government debt outstanding in the
eleven participating nations represents about forty-two percent
of total Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment ("OECD") government debt compared with twenty-four
percent for the United States and sixteen percent for Japan. Of
the euro countries, Germany was the largest issuer, with an eight-
een percent share of OECD total debt*with France close behind
at ten percent. Potential growth in the long-term European debt
market is large. Because long-term NCU debt has not been at-
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tractive to investors, Europe has been much more reliant .on
short-term bank lending than the United States. The Bank of
England states that roughly half of liabilities in the eleven EMU
countries consist of bank borrowing as opposed to less than
twenty-five percent for the United States. If even a fraction of
borrowers switch to the long-term debt market, then issuance
levels could explode.
Third, issuance of debt by individual governments within
the EMU will decline as forces in the Maastricht Treaty put pres-
sure on government borrowing. Adoption of the Stability and
Growth Pact will make it difficult for nations to borrow their way
out of economic problems. In addition, a nation's new inability
to monetize its own debt will force heavy borrowers to pay a risk
premium for excessive issuance.
Finally, although each Member State will continue to issue
its own debt, there is likely to be a movement toward standardi-
zation and transparency of the government markets to comply
with the requirements of a liquid, institutional securities market.
Debt likely will be issued on a pre-announced schedule, with
standardization as to maturities and coupon payments. There
will even be pressure on countries to eliminate nonstandard
practices, such as withholding taxes, in order to be considered
part of the "benchmark" pool.
As a result of these anticipated changes to the fixed-income
market, there already has been tremendous convergence in the
long-term interest rates of the eleven EMU countries despite the
differences in debt levels. This convergence can be seen in Fig-
ure 5. For example, Italy's public sector debt represents 122% of
gross domestic product ("GDP"), compared to the Maastricht
Treaty's criterion of sixty percent and Germany's level of sixty-
two percent. Obviously, for this convergence in long-term rates
to continue, Italy will have to continue to reduce public sector
debt levels and to improve its creditworthiness.
The markets have yet to determine the new euro fixed-in-
come "benchmark" yield curve. Debt markets in France, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands are all top-tier credits, and their
yields have converged to be nearly identical. The Netherlands,
however, continues to have a relatively high seventy percent
debt-to-GDP ratio, and the coupons of its outstanding debt are
higher, reflecting earlier battles with inflation. It is likely that
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FIGURE 5
Convergence of Government 1 O-Year Bond Yields
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French/German debt issues will be regarded initially as the "on-
the-run" issue pool. Indeed, MATIF and Eurex have announced
that they are combining their efforts to develop a new group of
multi-issuer euro government bond futures contracts.
A. Mechanics of Fixed-Income Conversion
The eleven members of EMU already have announced that
all new government debt will be issued in euro. In addition, all
eleven governments have agreed to "reconvention" their out-
standing and future government debt to be denominated in
euro and to comply with new standards, including day counts of
Actual/Actual annual coupons, 26 pricing in decimals, and Euro-
pean business days rather than local business days. These
changes occurred on the first business day after the conversion
weekend, creating a great deal of systems and back-office chal-
lenges.
Most non-governmental issuers also have announced that
they will redenominate their outstanding debt. The Interna-
tional Primary Markets Association, however, has asked its mem-
bers to postpone this redenomination until after the conversion
weekend to give back-office operations additional time to pre-
pare for the conversion.
26. Actual/Actual refers to actual days to payment over actual days in a year.
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B. Mechanics of Fixed-Income Futures Conversion
Each of the European futures exchanges has announced
plans both to deal with the delivery of redenominated govern-
ment bonds into NCU-denominated futures contracts after the
conversion weekend. They have also announced plans to trade
euro-denominated government bond contracts. The exchanges
differ in the type of government bond contracts traded-
whether multi-issuer or single issuer-and on the timing of the
transition.
1. LIFFE
LIFFE plans to focus on creating single-issuer government
bond futures, denominated in euro, to replace each of its ex-
isting bund and BTP contracts. 2 7 It also has discussed the possi-
bility of creating a multi-issuer contract at some point in the fu-
ture. A LIBOR-financed bond ("LFB") futures contract will be
denominated initially in Deutsche marks and later in euro. This
contract will be based on the five-and ten-year euro swap curve
and will be cash settled.
LIFFE has lira-denominated BTP and Deutsche mark-de-
nominated bund contracts for March 1999 delivery. These con-
tracts are denominated in euros beginning with the June 1999
listings. Conversion to euro-denominated contracts will take
place by rolling from March to June via the normal speed trad-
ing facility ("STF"), with a temporary moratorium on exchange
fees for these rolled contracts. The ratio of these March con-
tracts to the June contracts will depend on the relative sizes of
each contract, the relative basis point values, and the fixed ex-
change rates. For the March 1999 delivery, newly-rede-
nominated deliverable government debt will be delivered in ac-
cordance with the following formula: the June 1999 BTPs and
bunds have a nominal value of euro 100,000, with a tick size of
ten euros. Margining and mark-to-market were done in ECUs
prior to the conversion weekend.
2. Eurex
Like LIFFE, Eurex is trading its March 1999 delivery bund
27. BTP are ten-year German government bonds.
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and BOBL28 contracts in both Deutsche marks and euro. Prior
to the conversion weekend, euro-denominated contracts were
traded in ECU. Traders can convert their positions on the
spread trading facility on the exchange. Contracts starting with
June 1999 will be denominated in euros only. The list of quali-
fied German government debt deliverable into the contact will
remain the same. Redenominated debt, however, will be deliv-
ered into the Deutsche mark-denominated bund and BOBL con-
tracts using the fixed exchange rates to calculate nominal
amounts. The exchange continues to explore alternatives for
developing a multi-issuer, euro-denominated benchmark con-
tract.
3. MATIF
The MATIF is trading only a euro-denominated Notionnel
future for March 1999 delivery; the December 1998 Notionnel
future is the last denominated in French francs. The March
1999 Notionnel contract is a single-issuer contract, with a deliver-
able pool consisting of French government bonds ("OATs").
The exchange will introduce a contract that will include both
bunds and OATs when MATIF decides that sufficient conver-
gence has taken place, possibly as soon as the June 1999 contract
introduction. The MATIF already trades a multi-issuer ECU
bond contract. Beginning with the March 1999 ECU contract,
however, the deliverable pool will consist only of sovereign debt
issued in the EMU zone. The MATIF also has decided to try to
provide for trade between "in" and "out" country debt by intro-
ducing two new gilt contracts-a five-year and a ten-year. Trad-
ers wishing to speculate on convergence of British debt to the
EMU debt levels can take a position in the gilt contract and an
opposite position in either the euro Notionnel or the ECU con-
tract.
4. MEFF
The MEFF merely redenominated its existing bonds con-
tracts into euro on the conversion weekend. The odd lots that
result because the euro-denominated contract will be larger than
the peseta-based contract will be ,cash settled. All existing orders
28. BOBL are five-year German government bonds.
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on MEFF bonds were canceled and must be reentered as euro-
denominated orders.
VII. LONG-TERM INTEREST RATE TRADING STRATEGIES
Introduction of the euro creates several new trading strate-
gies for fixed-income instruments. Unlike the case in short-term
interest rates, divergence between the long-term interest rates of
the EMU member countries is a very real possibility because the
issuers will have varying credit ratings. For example, Germany
has a rating of AAA while Spain and Italy have an AA rating.
Assuming that LIFFE will continue to list the BTP contracts, a
trader could buy a new euro benchmark government bond con-
tract, such as the newly-redenominated bund contract, and short
the BTP. The contract ratio would depend on the duration of
the cheapest-to-deliver bonds in each contract. There will no
longer be any need to adjust for the different sizes of the nomi-
nal contract amount, as both should be denominated in euro
100,000.
In addition, introduction of a pool of similarly rated, euro-
denominated government debt will likely have a great effect on
traditional benchmark bonds such as U.S. Treasury bonds and
Japanese government bonds. The availability of alternative in-
vestments is likely to put pressure on U.S. interest rates. The
ECB might, however, adopt a tight monetary policy to ensure the
strength of the euro. U.S. ten-year rates are currently about
4.89% versus euro benchmark rates near 4.15% (Figure 6). A
trader who believes that the budget pressures of the EMU will
force euro rates higher could buy a ten-year note futures con-
tract at the Chicago Board of Trade and sell a new euro-denomi-
nated benchmark contract on any of the European exchanges.
The ratio will depend on the duration of the two cheapest-to-
deliver bonds and the conversion rate for the euro to U.S. dollar
that will prevail after the conversion weekend.
Finally, the United Kingdom could face a dramatically less
favorable borrowing climate as an "out" country than it has in
the past as a single European borrower nation. The United
Kingdom currently has an inflation rate of about 3.1% versus the
eleven EMU Member State rate of about one percent; the
United Kingdom's ten-year yields are higher, with a rate of
4.85% (Figure 7). In addition, the United Kingdom's debt-to-
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FIGURE 6
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FIGURE 7
10-Year Bond Yields: Germany and United Kingdom
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GDP ratio is one of the lowest in the European Union, at fifty-
three. A trader who believes that British debt will become less
desirable as a result of its "out" status could buy a euro-denomi-
nated benchmark futures contract and sell a LIFFE gilt contract.
Again, the ratio would depend on both the duration of the
cheapest-to-deliver bonds as well as the conversion ratio between
sterling and the euro.
Germany
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VIII. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
Many issues after the conversion weekend have yet to be re-
solved. Following is a summary of some of the key outstanding
questions:
" What specific actions will be taken by the ECB?
" Will the ECB focus more on money supply or on inflation?
* What will be the exact nature of the ECB's open market and
standing facilities (e.g., frequency, type of transactions,
quoted deposit, and lending rates)?
" What will be the attitude of the "out" countries toward
EMU?
" Will the Stability and Growth Pact involve sanctions against
countries that fail to rein in their budget deficits, in particu-
lar, Italy, or that have an inflation problem, e.g., Ireland?
* Which short-term rate will become the standard for swaps
and other futures-EURIBOR or euro LIBOR?
* What will be the exact design of the new euro long-term
government bond futures contracts and which contract will
become the most liquid?
IX. THE EURO: STRONG OR WEAK?
The most frequently asked question about the euro is: Will
it be strong or weak? The secondary issue, of course, is whether
it will last. Proponents of the euro argue that it will be no less
than the currency of the twenty-first century and rival the U.S.
dollar as the world's reserve currency. Skeptics insist that the
whole scheme is doomed to failure because of Europe's political
history.
Europeans favoring the euro point first and foremost to the
size and scope of the economic region that the currency will rep-
resent. As Table 3 illustrates, the collective population, GDP,
and share of world trade of the fifteen EU countries is slightly
larger than the United States, while foreign reserves are signifi-
cantly higher. Even after adjusting these figures to represent the
initial eleven countries switching to the euro, the numbers point
to Europe as a large, populous economic region with a major
share of world trade. Moreover, the fifteen EU countries collec-
tively run a large current account surplus, which should be seen
as a net positive for the common currency. Currently, the sur-
plus is about two percent of GDP versus the U.S. current account
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deficit of three percent of GDP. As a greater share of world
trade becomes denominated in euros, there will be greater need
to hold the currency.
In addition, advocates for the euro argue that a wide range
of economic benefits will accrue and make the currency strong.
These benefits include increased productivity, investment, and
efficiency in the European economies and far more stable eco-
nomic policies. In addition, the ECB arguably will be the most
independent central bank in the world because it is not depen-
dent on any political entity for its existence. The anticipated
growth in breadth and depth of Europe's financial markets ris-
ing from a single currency would provide another source of ri-
valry for the U.S. dollar. Some argue that central banks will in-
creasingly shift reserves out of the dollar and into the euro. Fi-
nally, the euro is seen as an outgrowth of the changing dynamics
of the information age, where capital flows know no borders or
restrictions and the nation-state is seen as being in decline, su-
perseded by technology.
Skeptics point to Europe's historical lack of success in
achieving unification. They also point out that the size of the
economic region does not determine a currency's strength or
weakness. After all, the Swiss franc has traditionally been a
strong currency even though Switzerland is a relatively small
country. What will determine the euro's strength or weakness is
the willingness of investors to hold it over the long run. In that
regard, the prospects for the euro remain up in the air and ulti-
mately dependent on the region's politics.
One of the questions skeptics continue asking is: Will the
eleven (and eventually fifteen) Member States be able to abide
by the terms of the Maastricht Treaty over time? Already there
are some calls for changes to the stability pact, which was
designed to keep the euro stable and strong by imposing strict
requirements on member countries to keep deficits and infla-
tion under control. The European governments who put the
plan into place in 1992 were mostly conservative. In the last few
years, control of those European governments has been replaced
by left-leaning Socialists. With a higher propensity to intervene
in the marketplace and in the economy in general, these new
governments may decide to loosen the fiscal requirements of the
Maastricht Treaty, thus threatening the agreement's foundation.
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As for a swift movement out of U.S. dollar reserves and into
the euro by major central banks, there is probably far too much
optimism on the part of euro proponents. Central banks that
hold large reserves are likely to take a slow approach in increas-
ing the share of reserves to the euro from the U.S. dollar. Cen-
tral banks are conservative institutions and would not want to
propel the world into a financial crisis by a sudden shift in re-
serve holdings, which could put the U.S. dollar into a downward
spiral. They are likely to take some time to assess the stability of
the new currency before increasing their holdings, as would any
conservative investor. Moreover, the major advantage of a re-
serve currency is also ultimately its undoing. The seniorage that
reserve currencies enjoy-whereby the country can easily run
deficits because foreign investors will hold their debt in re-
serve-typically leads to the currency's downfall. The destiny of
most reserve currencies has been to start strong and to decline
over time. That was the case for the British pound from the mid-
nineteenth century onward and for the U.S. dollar since it was
allowed to float in the 197 0s.
Although the euro may be the currency of the new "infor-
mation age" where borders matter far less than in the past, that
remains to be seen. A successful major currency never has been
launched without a strong central government, typically one
with a strong military system. Moreover, there never has been a
successful currency launched without some backing by metal,
usually gold. Perhaps rather than being the currency of the new
information age, the euro is simply the latest in the evolution of
paper currencies.
My view is that the euro will most likely start out on a strong
note but eventually will be tested. At some point, one or a few
Member States probably will fall out of line with the restrictions
of monetary union. If the euro can survive this test, then its
prospects will be good. It is worth noting that there is no provi-
sion in the Maastricht Treaty for a Member States to exit EMU.
What I can say with certainty is that the economic and mon-
etary union brought about by the Maastricht Treaty will result in
some of the most significant changes to the economic and polit-
ical landscape seen this century. Traders who are prepared for
the changes can profit from the tremendous number of new op-
portunities that are created in the foreign exchange, money, and
fixed-income markets.
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FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
What does European Monetary Union entail?
A new currency, the euro, was introduced with the onset of
EMU. This currency is the European Union's future single cur-
rency, manifested by the Treaty on European Union and signed
by the Member States in the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992.
EMU also means a single monetary policy, a single foreign ex-
change policy, and controls on government borrowing.
Which countries will be participating in EMU?
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain participated
in EMU at its start on January 1, 1999. Denmark, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom chose not to participate in EMU at that
time. Greece, the only remaining member of the European
Union, did not meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria required to
qualify for EMU.
When will the euro arrive?
The euro has been a legal currency since January 1, 1999,
and can be used in financial markets and for a range of company
activities. The bilateral exchange rates of the participating coun-
tries were fixed in May 1998 and came into effect on the conver-
sion weekend. Even though the euro will be Europe's currency,
however, it will not be available in notes and coins until January
1, 2002.
How can the euro be a real currency from January 1, 1999,
when it will not exist in the form of notes and coins until
January 1, 2002?
Monetary union could begin on January 1, 1999 because
many economic activities are rendered without cash. Transac-
tions in stock markets and markets in which government bonds
are traded can be completed and settled in euro without euro
notes and coins.
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Can the euro be used before January 1, 2002?
The euro cannot be used in any transactions that require
cash before that date. Banks may allow individuals to hold a
euro account, even though it may not be very useful until the
notes and coins are circulated.
Who will use the euro during the transition period between
January 1, 1999 and January 1, 2002?
International financial markets will use the euro instead of
the currencies that it replaces from January 1, 1999. Some
bonds and equities previously in national currencies will be
traded in euro. Governments of participating countries will is-
sue debt in euro and convert existing debt. Some multinational
firms operating in Europe intend to use the euro early on to
simplify their accounts and finances. They might ask their sup-
pliers to use the euro also.
Banks in participating countries must make conversions in
certain circumstances between national currency units and euro.
Some banks may offer euro accounts for businesses, but most
retail banks expect to run most services in national currencies
during this period. Retailers and small businesses will not use
the euro during the transitional period. Some businesses with
cross-border operations may want to be invoiced or paid in euro.
When are all national currencies expected to be out of circulation?
National banknotes and coins will be withdrawn from circu-
lation between January 1, 2002 and July 2002.
Why is Europe's future single currency called the "euro"
and not the ECU?
Euro was the chosen name by the heads of the European
Union and the participating governments. The Maastricht
Treaty stipulates that the ECU must convert one-to-one to the
euro on January 1, 1999.
The value of money can be sharply reduced by rising prices.
Who will take care of the euro and protect its value?
The European Central Bank is responsible for monetary
policy and backing the euro.
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How will single monetary policy be set?
The ECB will set short-term rates for the euro in order to
control inflation. The ECB will be an independent central bank,
so decisions will be made by central bankers, not politicians.
The interest rate set by the ECB will be used as the basis for
commercial interest rates.
What about foreign exchange policy?
Together with the finance ministers of the participating
countries, the ECB will decide on euro foreign exchange policy
toward other currencies. The ECB will have the ultimate respon-
sibility for inflation and interest rates, which are usually the most
important factors in determining longer-term exchange rates.
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TABLE 1
Timetable of Events
July 1, 1990
December 1991
February 1992
January 1, 1994
Stage One begins with the removal of exchange
controls, the inclusion in principle of all curren-
cies in the narrow band of the Exchange Rate
Mechanism ("ERM"), and measures to encourage
convergence.
Heads of government agree on Maastricht Treaty.
Maastricht Treaty signed, establishing the goal of
European Monetary Union ("EMU").
Stage Two begins. European Monetary Institute
is created and steps are taken to make central
banks independent of government.
December 1995 The name "euro" is agreed for single currency.
May 1998 EMU commences. Heads of state decide which
countries qualify for EMU, fix bilateral conver-
sion rates, and agree to maintain their economies
in line with the Maastricht Treaty convergence
criteria. European Central Bank ("ECB") mem-
bers are nominated and approved by European
Parliament.
January 1, 1999
January 1, 2002
July 1, 2002
Stage Three begins. Monetary union commences
with the irrevocable fixing of the conversion rates
of the countries qualified for EMU. The ECB ini-
tiates single monetary policy and foreign ex-
change rate policy conducted in euro. New trad-
able public debt will be issued in euro. The ECU
basket ceases to exist (i.e., 1 euro = ECU 1). Na-
tional currencies continue to have legal force.
ECB uses only the euro in its money market and
foreign exchange operations. TARGET system
comes into operation for cross-border settle-
ments.
New euro notes and coins are introduced and be-
gin circulating ("E-Day").
End of transition phase. National currency units
("NCU") of EMU members will be completely re-
placed and cease to existas a legal tender.
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TABLE 2
Currencies Belonging to the ECU, EU, or EURO
European Countries Participating
Currency Unit European Union in Common Currency
(ECU) (EU) (EURO)
* Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium
Britain Britain *
Denmark Denmark *
* Finland Finland
France France France
Germany Germany Germany
Greece Greece *
Ireland Ireland Ireland
Italy Italy Italy
Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Portugal Portugal Portugal
Spain Spain Spain
* Sweden *
TABLE 3
EU-15 Place in the World
OECD World Foreign
Population GDP Share Trade Share Exchange Reserves
(m/1995) (%/1996) (%1996) ($bn/1996)
U.S. 263 32.5 19.6 49.1
Japan 125 20.5 10.5 172.4
EU 170 38.3 20.9 349.8
Source: Financial Times
